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The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary
Policy: The Term Auction Facility
Daniel L. Thornton
This paper investigates the effectiveness of one of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary
policy tools, the term auction facility (TAF). At issue is whether the TAF reduced the spread
between the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) rates and equivalent-term Treasury rates by
reducing the liquidity premium embedded in LIBOR rates. This paper suggests that rather than
reducing the liquidity premium in LIBOR rates, the announcement of the TAF increased the risk
premium in financial and other bond rates because market participants interpreted the announce-
ment by the Fed and other central banks as a sign that the financial crisis was worse than previ-
ously thought. Evidence is presented that supports this hypothesis. (JEL E52, E58, G14)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2011, 93(6), pp. 439-53.
stress.1 In testimony before Congress on January
17, 2008, Chairman Bernanke (2008) indicated
that the goal of the TAF was to reduce the incen-
tive for banks to hoard cash and increase their
willingness to provide credit to households
and firms. That is, the Fed believed banks were
hoarding liquidity. Consequently, the increase
in the LIBOR spreads was a result of an increase
in a liquidity premium that banks were requiring
to lend in the interbank market. Christensen,
Lopez, and Rudebusch (2009, p. 2; hereafter CLR)
summarize the intended effectiveness of the TAF:
In theory, the provision of central bank liquid-
ity could lower the liquidity premium on inter-
bank debt through a variety of channels. On
the supply side, banks that have a greater assur-
ance of meeting their own unforeseen liquidity
needs over time should be more willing to
extend term loans to other banks. In addition,
creditors should also be more willing to pro-
vide funding to banks that have easy and
dependable access to funds, since there is a
BACKGROUND
T
he Federal Reserve’s actions in the wake of
the financial crisis have spurred research
into the effectiveness of unconventional
monetary policy. One unconventional policy
that has received considerable attention is the
term auction facility (TAF). At issue is whether
the TAF reduced the spread between the London
interbank offered rate (LIBOR) rates and equiva-
lent-term Treasury or overnight indexed swap
(OIS) rates. The Fed introduced the TAF based
on the belief that the increase in the spreads
between term LIBOR rates and equivalent-term
Treasury or OIS rates at the onset of the financial
crisis was due to an increase in the liquidity
premium in the interbank market. In announc-
ing the TAF the Fed noted that, by allowing the
Federal Reserve to inject term funds through a
broader range of counterparties and against a
broader range of collateral than traditional open
market operations, this facility could help pro-
mote the efficient dissemination of liquidity
when the unsecured interbank markets are under
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the demand side, with a central bank liquidity
backstop, banks should be less inclined to bor-
row from other banks to satisfy any precaution-
ary demand for liquid funds because their
future idiosyncratic demands for liquidity over
time can be met via the backstop.
To understand the issue, it is useful to con-
sider Figure 1, which shows the daily spread
between the 3-month LIBOR and Treasury bill
rates from January 2, 2007, through December 31,
2009. The three vertical lines denote the dates of
three important events: August 9, 2007, when BNP
Paribas, France’s largest bank, halted redemption
on three investment funds (the financial crisis is
assumed to begin on this date); December 12,
2007, when the Fed announced the TAF; and
September 15, 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.2 The spread
began increasing in March 2007, on news of prob-
lems with subprime loans in the mortgage market,
to a peak of 80 basis points in late June 2007 and
then declined. The spread increased dramatically
at the outset of the financial crisis to a peak of
about 240 basis points, declined again, and
increased again to a peak of nearly 220 basis
points on December 12, 2007; it then declined
dramatically following the TAF announcement
to a cyclical low of about 80 basis points in mid-
January 2008. From January 17, 2008, through
September 14, 2008, the spread averaged 112
basis points. The spread increased dramatically
again on Lehman’s announcement, to a peak of
452 basis points on October 10, 2008, and then
declined, eventually reaching pre-financial-crisis
levels in the latter half of 2009.
The Fed argued that the dramatic increase in
spreads in August 2007 reflected an increase in
banks’ liquidity premium—that is, banks were
demanding a higher rate on interbank lending
because of an increased demand for liquidity.
Taylor and Williams (2008a,b, 2009) and others
have argued that the increase in the interbank rate
spreads was due to an increase in the risk pre-
mium rather than an increase in a liquidity pre-
mium. If the increase in the LIBOR/T-bill spreads
was the consequence of an increase in the credit
risk premium, the TAF would have no effect on it.
Hence, this is a key question: Was the increase in
Thornton
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Figure 1
Daily Spread Between the 3-Month LIBOR and T-Bill Rates (January 2, 2007–December 31, 2009)the LIBOR/T-bill spreads at the outset of the finan-
cial crisis due to an increase in a liquidity pre-
mium or an increase in the credit risk premium.3
LIBOR spreads can reflect both liquidity and
credit risk premiums. To identify each type of
premium, it is necessary to compare rates and rate
spreads for banks that are without significant
liquidity constraints with comparable rates and
rate spreads for market participants that are liquid-
ity constrained. Most investigations of the efficacy
of the TAF have relied on an event-study method-
ology (e.g., Taylor and Williams, 2008a,b, 2009;
McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang, 2008; and Wu,
2008), which has yielded mixed results. Recently,
CLR have presented evidence from a six-factor
term structure model that indicates that the
announcement effect of the TAF had a very large
effect on the LIBOR rate. Specifically, CLR con-
duct a counterfactual experiment and find that the
announcement of the TAF reduced the liquidity
premium in the 3-month LIBOR rate by 82 basis
points relative to what the spread would have
been otherwise.
This paper adds to the existing literature in
three ways. First, and importantly, I consider
the behavior of the LIBOR/T-bill spreads both
before and after the TAF announcement because,
if nearly all of the change in the LIBOR/T-bill
spreads before the TAF can be accounted for by
changes in risk spreads, it is difficult to see how
the TAF could have generated a large reduction
in the liquidity premium. (If the liquidity pre-
mium did not increase significantly at the outside
of the financial crisis, the announcement of the
TAF could not have reduced it dramatically.)
Second, I show that CLR’s conclusion depends
critically on the marked increase in the spreads
between AA-rated financial bond rates and
equivalent-maturity LIBOR rates immediately
following the TAF announcement. I offer an alter-
native hypothesis for the marked increase in the
financial bond/ LIBOR rate spreads and present
a variety of evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Finally, I show that nearly all of the behavior of
the LIBOR/T-bill spreads both before and after
the TAF announcement is accounted for by the
risk premium and that when the risk premium is
accounted for, the TAF has at most a modest effect
on the LIBOR/T-bill spreads.
The remainder of the paper is as follows.
The next section briefly reviews the event-study
empirical analyses of the effect of the TAF. The
third section presents CLR’s affine-term-structure-
model approach for analyzing the effect of the
TAF. The section shows that CLR’s announcement
effect depends critically on the marked increase
in the spread between rates on (i) highly rated
corporate financial bond rates and (ii) equivalent-
maturity LIBOR rates immediately following the
announcement of the TAF. The fourth section
offers an alternative hypothesis for the marked
increase in this spread and presents evidence
consistent with this hypothesis. An empirical
analysis of the effect of the TAF on the LIBOR/
T-bill spreads is presented in the fifth section.
The final section offers conclusions.
Event-Study Investigations of the
Effects of the TAF
Taylor and Williams (2008a) were the first to
investigate whether the TAF had a significant
effect on the LIBOR rate. They investigated the
effect of the TAF by regressing the 1- and 3-month
spreads between the LIBOR and OIS rates on vari-
ous measures of counterparty risk and dummy
variables for TAF bid submission dates. In all
cases considered, the coefficient on the measure
of counterpart risk was positive and statistically
significant, indicating that some of the increase
in the spread was accounted for by risk premiums.
The coefficients on the TAF dummy variable were
also positive, but not statistically significant.
Based on their economic and empirical analyses,
Taylor and Williams concluded that increased
counterparty risk between banks contributed to
the rise in spreads and find no empirical evidence
that the TAF has reduced spreads.4
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3 See Krishnamurthy (2010) for a discussion of how an increase in
credit risk can cause an increase in the demand for liquid assets—
that is, assets that can be converted to cash quickly with no appre-
ciable market risk. However, this effect is endemic to the market
and is not unique to banks. Consequently, as I will show, it is
reflected in risk spreads generally.
4 Taylor and Williams (2008a, title page).McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) inves-
tigate the effect of the TAF on the LIBOR/OIS
spreads using a regression methodology similar
to that of Taylor and Williams (2008a). However,
they suggest that Taylor and Williams’s use of the
level of the spread in their regressions is valid
only under the assumption that the liquidity risk
premium falls on a day with a TAF event but
reverts to the previous level immediately after
the TAF event.5 Using the change in the spread
as the dependent variable and dummy variables
for all of the various auction announcements and
operations, they find that the TAF significantly
reduced the size of the LIBOR/OIS spreads.
Wu (2008) suggests that the methodology used
by Taylor and Williams (2008a) and McAndrews,
Sarkar, and Wang (2008) is problematic because
they (i) assume that the TAF had no effect on the
spreads other than on event days associated with
it, (ii) do not control for systematic counterparty
risk among major financial institutions, and (iii)
fail to separate the effects of lowering the counter-
party risk premiums from those relieving liquid-
ity concerns.6
Wu’s (2008) approach to analyzing the effec-
tiveness of the TAF differs from the two previous
approaches in three respects. First, rather than
using a TAF dummy variable for specific event
days only, Wu uses a TAF dummy variable that
is zero for all days prior to the TAF announce-
ment on December 12, 2007, and 1 thereafter. Wu
(2008) argues that because TAF lending was for
maturities of 28 days or longer, one would expect
that such loans would be able to relieve the finan-
cial strains for the duration of the loans—and not
simply affect the spreads on specific event days.
Wu also included alternative measures of stock
and bond market volatility and the eurodollar
rate volatility as well as a mortgage default risk
factor in his regression equations.7 In contrast to
the findings of Taylor and Williams (2008a), Wu
finds that the TAF has, on average, reduced the
1-month LIBOR/OIS spread by at least 31 basis
points and the 3-month LIBOR/OIS spreads by at
least 44 basis points. He also regresses his TAF
dummy variable on two measures of systematic
risk and, consistent with Taylor and Williams’s
analysis, finds that the coefficient is positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that the TAF
has not been able to reduce the counterparty
default risk premiums.8
A later paper by Taylor and Williams (2008b)
responds to criticism by McAndrews, Sarkar, and
Wang (2008) and Wu (2008) and others regarding
their earlier (2008a) work. First, they show that
the spreads between the LIBOR/OIS rates were
very similar to the spread between the LIBOR rate
and the repo rate on government securities, argu-
ing that the LIBOR/repo spread is a very good
measure of interbank risk because it is the differ-
ence in rates between secured and unsecured
lending between banks at the same maturity.9
The close correspondence between these rates
suggests that the LIBOR/OIS spreads primarily
reflects credit risk and not liquidity risk.
The authors also suggest that one could dis-
criminate between liquidity risk and counterparty
risk by comparing the behavior of rates paid to
others who lend to banks but are not liquidity
constrained, such as the rates paid on certificates
of deposit (CDs). Term CDs and term LIBOR loans
are alternative ways that banks finance their
shorter-term lending. Because purchasers of CDs
are not liquidity constrained, there is no reason
for CD rates to increase because of liquidity con-
cerns. However, because these instruments are
uninsured, CD rates will rise when market partici-
pants believe that lending to banks is more risky.
Consequently, the TAF should have no effect on
any liquidity premium embedded in CD rates.
Taylor and Williams (2008b) note that CD rates
have tracked LIBOR rates of comparable maturi-
ties very closely, suggesting that liquidity risk is
not a significant separate factor driving term lend-
ing rates.10 They also perform additional regres-
sion analysis altering the timing of how the TAF
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5 McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008, p. 10).
6 Wu (2008, p. 3).
7 The mortgage risk factor is the first principal component for credit
default swap rates for three mortgage companies.
8 Wu (2008, p. 2).
9 Taylor and Williams (2008b, p. 6).
10 Taylor and Williams (2008b, p. 10).might affect interest rates and using CD rates
based on a broader set of banks; they also conduct
regression analysis with the spreads between the
CD, term federal funds, and eurodollar rates and
the OIS rate (the dependent variable). They find
no evidence of a significant effect of the TAF in
any of these regressions.
Taylor and Williams (2008b) find that the
results using Wu’s (2008) TAF dummy variable
were fragile. Specifically, the coefficient was large
and statistically significant over one sample, but
not when the sample was extended.11 They also
investigate the effectiveness of the TAF using the
outstanding TAF loan balance. The estimated
coefficients were sometimes negative, but seldom
statistically significant.
Finally, the authors find that the results using
the first difference of the spread rather than the
level of the spread depended critically on the
timing of the variable in the regression and on
the particular TAF events considered. Noting that
the relationship between LIBOR/OIS spreads
and various measures of counterparty risk are
robust, they conclude that, while other researchers
have found significant TAF effects by altering
the specification of the empirical equation they
originally proposed, these results are sensitive to
small changes in specification, measures of the
spread, or measures of risk.12
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TAF:
RESULTS FROM A SIX-FACTOR
TERM STRUCTURE MODEL
CLR use a very different approach, noting
that the McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008)
and Wu (2008) conclusions about the effective-
ness of the TAF using regression analyses of
Taylor and Williams (2008a,b) are sensitive to
only small differences in the specifications of
their regression equations.13 Specifically, they
analyze the effectiveness of the TAF by estimat-
ing a six-factor arbitrage-free term structure model
based on a Nelson and Siegel (1987) yield curve.
There are three Nelson-Siegel factors for Treasury
yields, two Nelson-Siegel factors for bank bond
yields, and a single LIBOR factor. They estimate
the model using weekly data over the sample
period January 6, 1995, to July 25, 2008. They
note that their LIBOR factor changed significantly
immediately following the announcement of the
TAF (December 14, 2007), as did parameters of
their model that involve the LIBOR factor. They
then conduct a counterfactual experiment to
quantify the effect of the change in the model’s
behavior for the 3-month LIBOR rate. Specifically,
they fix the mean of the LIBOR factor at its pre-
announcement level and leave the other factors
unchanged. Their counterfactual experiment
suggests that the 3-month LIBOR rate would have
averaged about 80 basis points higher without
the TAF.14
Given the sensitivity of the regression
approaches to the specification of the equations
and other issues, CLR’s counterfactual result con-
stitutes the most compelling evidence that the
TAF had a significant effect of reducing the LIBOR
spreads. Consequently, it is important that this
evidence be analyzed carefully. Particularly impor-
tant is that CLR’s counterfactual result depends
critically on their LIBOR factor, which is based
on the spreads between the 3-, 6-, and 12-month
LIBOR rates and rates on AA-rated corporate
financial bonds with the same maturities. Their
factor differs little from the first principal com-
ponent obtained from these spreads. Given that
CLR assume that the LIBOR is independent of the
other five factors, this result is not surprising.
Figure 2 shows CLR’s factor and the first
principal component of the three rate spreads.
The vertical line denotes December 14, 2007 (the
week of the TAF announcement). The two factors
are very similar. Most important is the fact that
both decline markedly immediately following
the announcement of the TAF. The marked decline
in the LIBOR factor is a consequence of the AA-
rated corporate financial bond rates declining
relatively less than equivalent-term LIBOR rates
Thornton
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11 Also see Taylor and Williams (2009), which reflects work from
their two 2008 papers.
12 Taylor and Williams (2008b, p. 20).
13 Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2009, p. 4).
14 Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2009, p. 29).Thornton






















First Principal Component (left)
CLR LIBOR Factor (right)
Figure 2

































Percentage Points Percentage Points
Spread (right) LIBOR (left) AA Corporate Financial (right)
Figure 3
3-Month AA-Rated Corporate Financial Bond and LIBOR Rates and Their Spreadimmediately following the TAF announcement.
This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the
3-month AA-rated corporate financial bond rate,
the 3-month LIBOR rate, and their spread weekly
from January 5, 2007, through July 25, 2008. The
first vertical line denotes the week of the onset of
the financial crisis; the second denotes the week
of the TAF announcement. Both rates fell on the
TAF announcement, but the LIBOR rate declined
more than AA-rated corporate financial bond
rates, so the spread increased.15
Because this marked and very persistent
increase in the spread of AA-rated corporate finan-
cial bond rates over LIBOR rates is responsible
for CLR’s counterfactual result, it is important to
understand why highly rated corporate financial
bond rates increased relative to LIBOR rates fol-
lowing the TAF announcement. CLR suggest that
this decline in LIBOR rates relative to financial
bond rates is due to a marked reduction in the
Thornton
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liquidity premium that banks required to lend in
the interbank market. Specifi  cally, CLR suggest
that the bank bond rates are derived from debt
obligations issued to a broad class of investors
that overwhelmingly consists of nonbank insti-
tutions. While these two classes of lenders most
likely attach similar probabilities and prices to
credit risk, they likely have different tolerances for
liquidity problems.16 That is, the spread widened
because of a marked decline in the liquidity pre-
mium in the LIBOR rates relative to AA-rated
corporate financial bond rates.
There are two reasons to be skeptical of CLR’s
interpretation. First, if the sharp increase in the
spread of AA-rated corporate financial bond rates
over LIBOR rates were due to a decline in the
liquidity premium required by banks, the same
logic would imply that this spread should have
declined mark  edly at the onset of the financial
crisis because the liquidity premium required by
banks would have increased relative to that of the
15 The behavior of the 6- and 12-month spreads is very similar to
that of the 3-month spread. Indeed, the first principal component
























3-Month CD and LIBOR Rates and Their Spread
16 Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2009, pp. 26-27).financial bond rate. However, this did not occur.
Indeed, Figure 3 shows that, rather than decreas-
ing at the onset of the financial crisis, as CLR’s
interpretation would suggest, the spread increased;
however, it declined subsequently. On average
between the onset of the financial crisis and the
TAF announcement, the spread changed little
from the level for the weeks prior to the begin-
ning of the financial crisis. In short, the spread
increased rather than decreased, contrary to the
logic of CLR’s hypothesis.
Second, CLR’s interpretation suggests that
there should have been a comparable increase in
the spread between the 3-month CD and LIBOR
rates. CDs represent loans to banks by a broad
class of investors that overwhelmingly consists
of nonbank institutions and are a major source of
funds for bank lending. Lenders in the CD market
are not liquidity constrained and did not acquire
liquidity through the TAF. Consequently, we
should expect to see a marked decline in the
LIBOR rate relative to the CD rate following the
TAF announcement. Figure 4 shows the 3-month
CD and LIBOR rates and CD/LIBOR spread weekly
for the period January 5, 2007, through July 25,
2008. As before, the first and second vertical lines
denote the week of the onset of the financial crisis
and the TAF announcement, respectively. The 
3-month CD and LIBOR rates are nearly identical
before and after the onset of the financial crisis
and before and after the TAF announcement. The
variability of the CD/LIBOR spread increased with
the onset of the financial crisis, but there was
virtually no change in the average spread, which
was –4 basis points before the financial crisis and
–1 basis point after the TAF announcement.
AN ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS
FOR THE BEHAVIOR OF THE
CORPORATE FINANCIAL BOND/
LIBOR SPREAD
This section offers an alternative hypothesis
for this marked change in behavior of the AA
corporate financial/LIBOR spread following the
Thornton
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TAF announcement, which I call the increased-
risk-premium hypothesis (IRPH).17 Specifically,
it is possible that the market participants inter-
preted the Fed’s announcement of the TAF as an
indicator that the financial crisis was more serious
than previously thought. The IRPH seems partic-
ularly credible given that the Bank of England,
the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Canada, and
the European Central Bank announced measures
designed to address elevated pressures in short-
term funding markets on the same day. If market
participants believed these announcements sig-
naled that the financial crisis was worse than
previously thought, the TAF and other announce  -
ments could have caused a reassessment of the
credit risk of financial firms, increasing the spread
between corporate financial bond rates and LIBOR
rates.
Evidence of the IRPH: The Behavior of
Risk Spreads
The IRPH is supported by the fact that spreads
between corporate financial and non-financial
bond rates and the LIBOR rate increased follow-
ing the TAF announcement. Figure 5 shows the
spreads between 3-month (i) AA-rated corporate
financial, (ii) AA-rated corporate industrial, and
(iii) BBB-rated corporate industrial weekly bond
rates and the 3-month LIBOR rate weekly over
the period January 5, 2007, through July 25, 2008.
The vertical lines denote the onset of the financial
crisis and the TAF announcement, respectively.
The spreads initially declined with the onset of
the financial crisis and the industrial spreads
declined prior to the TAF announcement, while
the AA-rated corporate financial bond spread
remained relatively stable at about 50 basis points.
All three spreads increased following the TAF
announcement. Moreover, all three spreads
increased by similar amounts between the week
17 There were reports that the LIBOR rate (which is obtained from
surveys) was understating the rate that banks were actually pay-
ing in the interbank market during the financial crisis (e.g.,
Mollenkamp and Whitehouse, 2008). Kuo, Skeie, and Vickery
(2010) provide evidence supporting these claims. However, their
estimates of the degree of understatement during this period is
not large enough to account for CLR’s findings.of the announcement and the week of January 25,
2008: The AA corporate financial/LIBOR, AA
industrial/LIBOR, and BBB industrial/LIBOR
spreads increased by 102, 123, and 106 basis
points, respectively. The similarity in the behavior
of the spreads before and after the TAF announce  -
ment strongly supports the IRPH. As noted above,
if the announcement was taken as an indicator
that the financial crisis was worse than previously
thought, credit risk premiums would have
increased, which they did. Indeed, not only did
all of these corporate bond rates rise relative to
the LIBOR rate, but the spread between BBB and
AA industrial corporate bonds—a commonly used
measure of credit risk—also increased dramati-
cally, from 33 basis points prior to the TAF
announcement to a peak of 165 basis point in
early June 2008. This establishes the possibility
that the marked increase in the AA corporate
financial/LIBOR spread, which accounts for CLR’s
counterfactual result, is due to an increase in the
risk premium rather than to a decrease in a liquid-
ity premium, as they hypothesize.
Thornton
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Evidence of the IRPH: The Behavior of
Corporate Financial and Bank Bond
Spreads
The IPRH is also consistent with the relative
behavior of corporate financial and bank bond
rates. Figure 6 shows the spread between 3-month
AA-rated corporate financial and AA-rated bank
bond rates. The data are weekly over the period
January 5, 2007, through July 25, 2008. The ver-
tical lines denote the onset of the financial crisis
and the TAF announcement, respectively. The
spread averaged a few basis points in early 2007
and rose on news of subprime mortgage problems.
The spread increased further following the onset
of the financial crisis, averaging about 10 basis
points before the financial crisis and 49 basis
points from the onset of the financial crisis to
the week prior to the TAF announcement. The
spread increased further following the announce  -
ment before declining in June 2008. The behavior
of the AA corporate financial/AA bank bond
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Figure 5
Spreads Between the 3-Month AA-Rated Corporate Financial and AA-Rated and BBB-Rated
Industrial Bond Rates and the 3-Month LIBOR Ratesons. First, the implicit guarantee to bank
investors associated with “too big to fail” was
initially thought not to apply to non-bank finan-
cial corporations, at least before the Bear Sterns
bailout. Second, financial corporations had greater
exposure to mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
than did banks generally.18 For both of these
reasons, it is reasonable to expect that corporate
financial bond rates would rise relative to bank
bond rates.
Evidence of the IRPH: CLR’s LIBOR
Factor and Risk Spreads
The analysis above strongly suggests that
CLR’s LIBOR factor reflects a marked change in
the risk premium rather than a marked change in
a liquidity premium, as they hypothesize. To
see how much of the variation in CLR’s LIBOR
factor can be accounted for by risk premiums,
the LIBOR factor is regressed on risk premiums
reflected in the spreads between BBB-rated and
AA-rated corporate bank and industrial bond
rates. The spreads are for maturities of 3, 6, and
12 months—the same maturities that CLR used
to obtain their LIBOR factor. The sample period
begins with the availability of AA-rated bank
bond rate data, March 17, 2000. These six risk
premiums account for 44 percent of the weekly
variation in CLR’s LIBOR factor over the sample
period March 10, 2000, through July 25, 2008.
To see whether these risk premiums account
for more or less of the variation during periods
when the LIBOR factor is relatively more variable
(especially following the announcement of the
TAF), the regression equation is estimated using
a rolling window of 60 weeks. Figure 7 presents
the rolling window regression estimates of R –2 over
the sample period. The data are plotted on the last
week in the sample. The vertical line denotes the
first sample to include post-TAF-announcement
data. The estimates show that the risk premiums
account for relatively more of the variation in
18 Of the $4.4 trillion of agency and GSE-backed securities held by
financial institutions in the second quarter of 2007, only $1.1 
trillion was held by banks.
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Figure 6
3-Month AA Corporate Financial/AA Bank Bond SpreadCLR’s LIBOR factor when it is particularly variable
(see Figure 2). For example, between 2001 and
2003, risk premiums account for over 80 percent
of the variation for a period of a year or longer.
Importantly, for the issue of whether CLR’s coun-
terfactual results are evidence of the success of the
TAF in reducing liquidity premiums, the estimate
of R –2 increases dramatically when post-TAF-
announcement data are included in the sample.
The estimate of R –2 peaks at 82 percent for the
60-week period ending April 4, 2008.
It may also be the case that the sharp increase
in the spread of LIBOR rates over equivalent-
maturity Treasury rates was at least partly due to
an increase in the risk premium associated with
bank lending. To investigate this possibility, the
3-month LIBOR/T-bill spread was regressed on
the same six risk premiums over the same sample
period. The risk premiums account for 50 percent
of the variation in the LIBOR/T-bill spread over
the entire sample period. Figure 8, which plots
the 60-week rolling estimate of R –2 for a regression
of the LIBOR/T-bill spread on the six risk premi-
ums, shows that after declining to essentially zero,
the estimate of R –2 increased dramatically follow-
ing the onset of the financial crisis (the first ver-
tical line). It continued to increase to a peak of
nearly 70 percent following the TAF announce-
ment (the second vertical line).
EXPLAINING THE BEHAVIOR OF
THE LIBOR/T-BILL SPREADS
The analysis in the previous section suggests
that CLR’s LIBOR factor is largely accounted for
by risk premiums and does not present strong
support for the effectiveness of the TAF. However,
the evidence using weekly data suggests that the
TAF may have been effective in reducing the
LIBOR/T-bill spread.
This issue is investigated more thoroughly in
this section using daily data using corporate
bond/T-bill spreads not previous used in the liter-
ature. The corporate bond/T-bill spreads are for
corporate bank, industrial, and retail bonds. These
spreads are denoted BT3, IT3, and RT3, respec-
tively. The CD/T-bill and LIBOR/T-bill spreads
Thornton










































60-Week Rolling Estimates of Adjusted R2 of the CLR LIBOR Factor on Corporate Risk Spreadsare denoted CDT3 and LT3, respectively. The
effect of the TAF is investigated further by esti-
mating the equation
LT3t = α + βbBT3t + βiIT3t + βrRT3t + δDUMVEC + ￿t,
where DUMVEC is a vector of dummy variables
that reflect important TAF dates used in the pre-
vious event-study literature and ￿t is an i.i.d. error
term. To make the results comparable to the pre-
vious event studies, different sets of dummy
variables identical to those used by Taylor and
Williams (2008ab), McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang
(2008), and Wu (2008) are used. There are six
dummy variables. The first five are those used
by McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008): The
dates of international announcements related to
the TAF (ANI), domestic TAF announcements
(AND), dates when the conditions of the announce  -
ment were set (CON), when the auction took place
(AUC), and when banks were notified (NOT).19
The sixth dummy variable is that used by Wu
(2008), denoted Wu, which is zero before
December 12, 2007, and 1 thereafter. The sample
period is March 10, 2000, through April 30, 2008.20
The results are presented in Table 1. The 
p-values are based on HAC standard errors. The
results in the first two columns use McAndrews,
Sarkar, and Wang’s (2008) dummy variables. The
results indicate that LT3 is significantly related
to each of the corporate bond spreads; the coeffi-
cient on each bond spread is positive and highly
statistically significant. Moreover, the sum of the
coefficients is 0.92 and the hypothesis that the
sum of the coefficients is 1 is not rejected at the
5 percent significance level. The estimates of the
coefficients on TAF dummy variables provide no
evidence that the TAF had any significant effect
on the LIBOR/T-bill spread: The coefficients on
the ANI and AND dummy variables are positive,
but not statistically significant. The coefficients
on TAF operation dummy variables are negative,
19 These dates can be found in McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008,
Table 1, p. 20).
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60-Week Rolling Estimates of Adjusted R2 of the 3-Month LIBOR/T-Bill Spread on 
Corporate/T-Bill Risk Spreads
20 The sample ends on April 30, 2008, to make the TAF sample period
similar to that used by McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) and
Wu (2008).but not statistically significant. The results in the
next two columns show that the conclusion does
not change when the ANI and AND are combined.
There is some evidence that the TAF has been
effective in reducing the LIBOR/T-bill spread
when Wu’s dummy variable is included. The
estimate of the coefficient on Wu is negative and
statistically significant, but the coefficient esti-
mate, 34 basis points, is 10 basis points smaller
than Wu’s estimate. Moreover, consistent with
the findings of Taylor and Williams, the coeffi-
cient on Wu tends to decline and becomes statis-
tically insignificant as the length of the sample
increases. It is also the case that evidence of the
effectiveness of the TAF all but disappears when
CDT3 is included as a regressor: The estimate is
negative and statistically significant at slightly
higher than the 5 percent significance level, but
the magnitude of the effect is only 3 basis points.
CONCLUSION
This paper reviews the previous literature on
the effectiveness of the TAF in reducing the spread
between equivalent-maturity LIBOR and T-bill
rates and further investigates the effectiveness of
the TAF using weekly and daily data. The previ-
ous literature using event-study methodologies
finds mixed results. The most compelling evi-
dence for the effectiveness of the TAF comes from
CLR’s (2009) six-factor term structure model.
Performing a counterfactual analysis based on a
marked change in the LIBOR factor of their model,
CLR indicated that the 3-month LIBOR/T-bill
spread would have been 82 basis points higher
were it not for the TAF. Noting that CLR’s LIBOR
factor is based on the spreads between AA-rate
financial corporate bond rates and LIBOR rates,
I show that these spreads are highly correlated
with risk spreads, especially during the post-TAF-
announcement period.
I offer an alternative hypothesis for the behav-
ior of the spread between AA-rated financial cor-
porate bond rates and LIBOR rates following the
announcement of the TAF. Specifically, I hypothe-
size that market participants revised up their
expectations of the seriousness of the financial
crisis in the wake of the TAF announcement and
Thornton
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Table 1
The Effect of the TAF on the 3-Month LIBOR/T-Bill Spread
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Constant –0.040 0.111 –0.040 0.116 –0.089 0.001 0.060 0.000
βb 0.415 0.000 0.414 0.000 0.547 0.000 –0.014 0.229
βi 0.275 0.007 0.275 0.007 0.266 0.002 0.007 0.431
βr 0.226 0.001 0.225 0.001 0.230 0.000 0.058 0.000
ANI 0.331 0.168 —— —— — —
AND 0.115 0.541 —— ——— —
ANI+AND —— 0.224 0.241 0.281 0.131 0.042 0.082
CON –0.005 0.968 –0.004 0.975 0.096 0.377 0.016 0.350
AUC –0.168 0.160 –0.167 0.160 –0.048 0.639 –0.006 0.591
NOT –0.214 0.121 –0.213 0.108 –0.087 0.375 –0.016 0.136
Wu ——— — –0.340 0.012 –0.031 0.058
CDT3— — — — — — 0.928 0.000
R
–2 0.764 — 0.764 — 0.778 — 0.995 —
SE 0.172 — 0.172 — 0.166 — 0.026 —
NOTE: SE, standard error.the announcements of other central banks. I
present evidence from a variety of risk spreads
that is consistent with this alternative hypothesis,
including the fact that over 80 percent of CLR’s
LIBOR factor is accounted for by risk spreads
during this period. This suggests that much of
the effect of the TAF that CLR report is actually
due to an increase in the risk premium on finan-
cial bonds rather than a reduction in the liquidity
premium embedded in LIBOR rates. Moreover,
this evidence is consistent with the fact that there
was no significant decline in the spread between
the AA-rated corporate financial bond rates and
the LIBOR at the outset of the financial crisis: 
If there was no significant increase in banks’
liquidity premium, it is difficult to understand
how the TAF could have reduced it.
I also show that the majority of the 3-month
LIBOR/T-bill spread before and after the TAF
announcement can be accounted for by the
spreads between financial and nonfinancial cor-
porate bond rates. Further analysis using daily
data indicates that controlling for these risk pre-
miums, TAF appears to have had little or no effect
on the 3-month LIBOR/T-bill spread.
Thornton
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